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COMMENTS
RETREAT DOES NOT EQUAL SURRENDER:
DEFENSIVE DEADLY FORCE IN
DWELLINGS AFTER PEOPLE V. AIKEN
ERIC DEL Pozot
INTRODUCTION
Like gridlock, tourists, and exorbitant prices, deadly private
violence is an unfortunate fact of life in New York.1 Obviously,
no one wishes to be the target of such violence.2 Should the
situation arise, however, a New Yorker must retreat if
practicable before responding with defensive deadly force. 3 This
t J.D. Candidate, 2008, St. John's University School of Law; A.B., Philosophy,
2001, Dartmouth College. I would like to thank the following people for their help:
Frank Cavanagh, St. John's Law Review Editor-in-Chief emeritus; Brandon Del
Pozo, Ph.D. candidate and armed-warfare guru; and Professor Michael Simons.
1 See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1986)
(quadruple subway shooting); People v. Rosas, 30 A.D.3d 545, 818 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d
Dep't 2006) (double murder); People v. Charles, 237 A.D.2d 816, 655 N.Y.S.2d 459
(3d Dep't 1997) (suspected triple murder). On perhaps the City's darkest day-and
there are several contenders-scores of neighbors went about their business as
Queens resident Kitty Genovese lay stabbed and screaming outside of her apartment
building. See Jim Rasenberger, Kitty, 40 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, § 14,
at 1 ("Clergymen and politicians decried the events, while psychologists scrambled to
comprehend them."). In true New York fashion, the story of Genovese's life has since
been turned into an operatic musical production. See Barbara Hoffman, Showtime!-
Tragedy, Like the Kitty Genovese Murder, Gets a Musical Makeover, N.Y. POST, Sept.
9, 2006, at 25.
2 With good reason: New York defines deadly force as that which, "under the
circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious
physical injury." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(11) (Consol. 2007). Only twenty years ago,
the odds of an American being murdered were 1 in 133. Around the Nation: Odds of
Being Murdered Are 1 in 133, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1985, at A14.
3 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (Consol. 2007) ("[An] actor may not use
deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to
oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating."). An
increasing number of states disagree with this view. See Adam Liptak, 15 States
Expand Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at Al. The
divergence will be discussed more fully infra.
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rule has an important exception: An innocent person under siege
inside her own home is legally justified in killing her attacker
without backing down. 4
Although states commonly exempt those assaulted in their
dwellings from retreat, the exception varies in its application.
For example, consider the homeowner on his outdoor front porch
who sees a longtime friend approaching. Suppose that the men
had previously engaged in a heated drunken argument. The
friend, still harboring a grudge apparently, lugs a wooden bow.
From a distance, he launches a wayward arrow at the
homeowner, who picks it up and breaks it. As our intrepid
archer loads another arrow, the homeowner grabs a nearby rifle
and shoots him dead. These events are not imaginary. One
state's appellate court, on identical facts, labeled the killing
justified since the shooter happened to be in the immediate
vicinity of his home. 5
New York awards its dwelling inhabitants a narrow license
to fight back. In People v. Aiken,6 the New York Court of Appeals
held unanimously that a person standing in his apartment
doorway has a duty to retreat inside before using deadly force in
self-defense. Aiken's unfortunate downward spiral involved
neighbors of forty years whose Bronx apartments shared a
common wall. The protagonists engaged in a decade-long dispute
over the defendant's alleged siphoning of the victim's telephone
and cable services. "In 1997, following a heated verbal exchange,
the victim stabbed defendant in the back, hospitalizing him for
two days."7  Not finished, the victim then menaced the
defendant's family for several years. In 1999, during another
argument, the defendant "knocked an indentation into his side of
the wall" with a metal pipe.8 The victim went downstairs to let
in police, while the defendant-rather than remaining inside-
brandished the pipe by his apartment's open doorway. Upon
4 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (Consol. 2007) (exempting from retreat
anyone "in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor"). This provision is the
focus of this Comment.
5 See State v. Church, 258 S.E.2d 812, 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ('When a person
who is without fault in bringing on the difficulty is attacked upon his own premises,
he has no duty to retreat before he can act in self-defense.").
6 4 N.Y.3d 324, 828 N.E.2d 74, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2005). Section 35.15 of the
New York Penal Law remains unchanged since Aiken.
7 Id. at 326, 828 N.E.2d at 75, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
8 Id. at 326, 828 N.E.2d at 76, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
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returning upstairs, the victim saw this, reached into his own
pocket, pressed his face against the defendant's, and threatened
him with death. "Believing he was about to be stabbed again,
defendant struck the victim on his head with the metal pipe,
killing him."9 The victim's claims of illegal diversion of his cable
and telephone services were unfounded.
The Court of Appeals, while affirming that there is no duty
to retreat from one's home, held that defendant in Aiken
nonetheless had a duty to retreat into his home.10 Significantly,
the court rejected the defendant's argument that his doorway
was a part of his dwelling for self-defense purposes: "The
doorway did not function as the asylum of the home-it was
instead a hybrid private-public space in which a person did not
have the same reasonable expectation of seclusion and refuge
from the outside world."1 The goal was to strike a balance
"between protecting life by requiring retreat and protecting the
sanctity of the home by not requiring retreat."1 2 Aiken's message
to New Yorkers thus appears to be: If you can do so safely, take
refuge in your dwellings before meeting deadly violence in kind.
This Comment applauds the -Court of Appeals for striking
the correct balance. Part I examines the duty to retreat before
using defensive deadly force. It argues that retreat follows from
the necessity requirement built into the concept of justification.
Part I concludes with an overview of the dwelling exception,
tracking its evolution in New York through Aiken. Part II of this
Comment advocates narrowing the dwelling exception to serve its
purposes. To begin, Part II asserts that the exception may be
read as a rule in defense of property. It then suggests that
Aiken's holding covers not just apartment tenants but all
dwelling inhabitants, who should be required to retreat from
their property's curtilage into their houses, if they can safely do
so, before using defensive deadly force. Finally, Part II argues
briefly against the recent trend among states to eliminate retreat
altogether. The desire is not to endanger those who face
9 Id. at 326, 828 N.E.2d at 76, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
10 See id. at 327, 828 N.E.2d at 77,- 795 N.Y.S.2d at 161 ("The rationale that
evolved-now widely accepted-is that one should not be driven from the inviolate
place of refuge that is the home." (emphasis added)).
11 Id. at 330, 828 N.E.2d at 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 163. This finding was within
judicial bounds, as section 35.15(2)(a)(i) states that a person need not retreat from
her own "dwelling" without defining the term.
12 Id. at 328, 828 N.E.2d at 77, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
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potential violence in the vicinity of their homes, but rather to
weigh their entitlement to personal safety against society's
interest in avoiding senseless killings. 13
I. THE DUTY TO RETREAT (SOMETIMES) WHEN ATTACKED ON
ONE'S OWN PROPERTY
A. An Analysis of the Duty to Retreat Before Using Defensive
Deadly Force
1. Retreat Follows Logically from Self-Defense's Necessity
Requirement
Like a skier running a slalom, section 35.15 of New York's
Penal Law alternates between condemnation and exculpation.
Physical force against another is justified only when a person
reasonably believes it necessary to defend herself or a third party
from an imminent unlawful physical attack. 14 With a few
exceptions, deadly physical force is not permitted unless
reasonably believed necessary to ward off an attack likely to
produce almost certain death. 15 Even so, defensive deadly force
is not available to a potential victim who "knows that with
complete personal safety, to oneself and others" she may avoid
the violent encounter altogether by retreating.16 Thus, a person
13 It bears repeating that the Aiken defendant killed his neighbor of four
decades in an argument over cable television.
14 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1) (Consol. 2007). Although judicial interpretations
vary, this basic self-defense provision is like that of nearly every jurisdiction. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(1) (2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(a) (West 2007); PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(a) (2007). Force being
justified means that the actor may not be convicted for it. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 199 (West 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.00 (Consol. 2007) ("In any prosecution for
an offense, justification .. . is a defense."). The driving idea is a balancing of harms
"according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.05(2) ("Justification; generally"). The choice resulting in the lesser harm for
society is by definition justified, and should be tolerated or even encouraged. See,
e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 250-52 (4th ed. 2006).
15 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (Consol. 2007). Again, this proportionality
requirement mirrors that of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-
304(2) ("The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the actor believes
that deadly force is necessary to protect himself against death ... ").
16 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (Consol. 2007). Not all retreat rules are
statutory; some have been carved out judicially. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 671 P.2d
973, 974 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 218 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 1966)
("The right of self-defence does not accrue to a person until he has availed all proper
[Vol. 82:359
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under attack in New York-whether on a city block or rural
road-is not relieved of liability for killing her assailant if she is
aware of at least one non-deadly alternative.
17
The prerequisite that defensive force, to be justified, appear
necessary makes retreat a lesser included of this principle. "If it
is possible to safely avoid an attack then it is not necessary, and
therefore not permissible, to exercise deadly force against the
attacker."18 Hence, the rule in a no-retreat jurisdiction may be
restated: A person is entitled to use deadly force if she
reasonably believes it necessary to repel unlawful deadly force in
the exact place that she happens to be when it dawns on her that
an assault may be imminent. To this end, supporters of recent
laws eliminating the duty to retreat from potentially deadly
conflicts have labeled the measures "stand your ground" laws. 19
The laws themselves often invite such characterization. 20 In
theory, however, standing one's ground undercuts the
seriousness of any necessity requirement.
2. Retreat Is Required Only in Narrowly Defined
Circumstances
Jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether consideration
of retreat is nominally required before using defensive deadly
force against an attacker. 21 Presently, a minority espouses "what
means to avoid physical combat."). The dwelling exception will be addressed infra
Part I.B.
17 New Yorkers with only moderately violent tendencies take heart: "It seems
everywhere agreed that one who can safely retreat need not do so before using
nondeadly force." 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 155 (2d ed.
2003).
is People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 40 (Mich. 2002); see also 2 PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 80 (1984) ("The retreat rule has been criticized
as an obsolete necessity requirement."). Some judicial opinions intertwine the two
concepts. For example, the D.C. Circuit in Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414
(D.C. Cir. 1923), stated that "the right of self-defense does not arise until [one] has
done everything in his power to prevent its necessity."
19 See generally Robert Tanner, Growing Right to Use Deadly Force; More States
Pass 'Stand Your Ground' Laws, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 26, 2006, at A4.
Conversely, the measures' detractors have called them "shoot first" laws. See id.
20 For instance, a Tennessee denizen "who is not engaged in unlawful activity
and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before
threatening or using force against another person." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(a)
(2007).
21 See DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 226-27 (noting that as recently as 2001, a
"slim majority of jurisdictions applied the rule that a non-aggressor is permitted to
use deadly force to repel an unlawful deadly attack, even if he is aware of a place to
3632008]
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might be regarded as a more civilized view" by compelling retreat
under safe conditions.22 The majority view, however, is rapidly
gaining momentum. 23 Fifteen states have recently passed laws
abrogating retreat and "expand[ing] the right of self-defense,
allowing crime victims to use deadly force in situations that
might formerly have subjected them to prosecution for murder." 24
The effect has been to "remove criminal charges and civil liability
for people who shoot down an attacker without first trying to flee
if they feel their lives are in danger."25 The law is in such flux
that foreign media outlets have commented. 26
Still, even in jurisdictions that mandate it, retreat is
required in few circumstances. For instance, it is recommended
only where the actor can attempt escape without increasing her
own peril.27 This subjective standard focuses on what a person
knew in fact at the time, rather than "whether defendant 'could
have retreated' with complete safety" looking at the totality of
circumstances in hindsight. 28 One need not calmly evaluate exit
strategies when faced with pressing danger, for "[d]etached
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife."29  Nor is fleeing ever required when threatened with a
which he can retreat in complete safety"). The divide is nothing new. Compare Beard
v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895) (negating duty to retreat provided
"defendant was where he had the right to be"), with Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492, 497 (1896) (sanctioning defensive deadly force "provided [one] use all the means
in his power otherwise to save his own life or prevent the intended harm, such as
retreating as far as he can").
22 2 LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 155-56.
23 See Liptak, supra note 3; Tanner, supra note 19.
24 Liptak, supra note 3. The new laws' consequences will be examined briefly
infra Part II.B.
25 Tanner, supra note 19.
26 See, e.g., Tony Allen-Mills, Victims with a Licence to Kill Confuse US Law,
TIMES (London), Aug. 13, 2006, at 22 (echoing concerns that the recent trend
"encourage[s] mayhem-with suburban neighbours gunning each other down every
time they [see] a shadow").
27 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (Consol. 2007) (conditioning retreat on
"complete personal safety, to oneself and others"). "The rule has not been
interpreted, either by statute or judicial opinion, to require retreat into self-
destruction." 2 ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 80 (citing cases).
28 See People v. Doctor, 98 A.D.2d 780, 781, 469 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (2d Dep't
1983) (contrasting the statutory test with an incompatible "objective standard").
29 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.); see also Rowe
v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 558 (1896) (proclaiming that the law has never
compelled a defendant "to step aside when his assailant was rapidly advancing upon
him with a deadly weapon").
[Vol. 82:359
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firearm. 30 New York, moreover, construes necessity liberally,31
with the result that deadly force may be justified more readily
without retreat than in other states. 32 Additionally, fleeing is
often the province of those who have played some active role in
escalating matters. 33 In sum, these facts paint retreat as a tool of
conflict avoidance rather than one of improvised escape.
Retreat's role in the self-defense context is more theoretical than
practical.
B. An Examination of the Dwelling Exception to the Retreat
Rule
1. A Brief Overview of the Dwelling Exception
In any jurisdiction, a person forcefully attacked inside her
own dwelling may counter immediately with deadly force. 34 This
is not a recent development, as early American judicial opinions
made it "clear that people did not have to retreat from their own
30 "[N]o one could consider escape as reasonably possible from a pistol
purposefully and directly aimed at the assailed." People v. Liguori, 284 N.Y. 309,
318, 31 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1940) (reversing lower court due to mere issuance of jury
instruction mentioning retreat). "Indeed, to retreat [from a firearm] would be to
invite almost certain death." Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414-15 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
31 The necessity requirement in section 35.15(1) of New York's Penal Law has
been expanded almost infinitely via the related reasonableness provision. See People
v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 114, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 29 (1986) (ruling
that "a determination of reasonableness must be based on the circumstances facing a
defendant or his situation," including all relevant perceptions, knowledge, and prior
experience (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32 See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 138 A.D.2d 169, 175-76, 530 N.Y.S.2d 802, 806 (1st
Dep't 1988) (remanding for review of victim's psychiatric records to determine
whether the defendant could conceivably have been justified in believing deadly
force was necessary). It makes sense that the more situations in which deadly force
may reasonably be felt necessary, the narrower the circumstances in which the
actor, believing herself compelled to fight back, will have a duty to avoid the conflict.
There are limits, however. For example, where the victim was "lying face down with
gunshot wounds to the leg and chest when defendant shot him at close range in the
back of the head," no self-defense instruction was appropriate. People v. Barber, 269
A.D.2d 758, 758, 703 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (4th Dep't 2000) (basing decision on
opportunity for retreat).
33 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (Consol. 2007) (compelling retreat
for anyone, even someone in her own dwelling, qualifying as an "initial aggressor").
Aiken seemingly ignores this provision. See infra Part I.B.2.
34 The rationale being either that a jurisdiction has enacted a dwelling
exception to its retreat rule, see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i), or
alternatively that it does not require retreat whatsoever.
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homes when attacked."35  For instance, in United States v.
Beard,36 the Supreme Court held that "[t]he accused being where
he had a right to be, on his own premises, constituting a part of
his residence and home," did not have to withdraw before killing
his attacker. 37 Similarly, in People v. Tomlins,38 the New York
Court of Appeals reiterated that "[i]t is not now and never has
been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is bound to
retreat. '39 This aversion to abandoning one's symbolic castle is
traced back to English common law.40
Although the issue of retreat from one's dwelling appears
settled, the question of what a "dwelling" is for purposes of the
exception remains muddled. Beard paved the way for an
expansive reading by holding that the defendant was under no
greater obligation to retreat "when on his own premises ... than
he would have been if attacked within his dwelling house."41
Many states likewise have extended immunity from retreat to all
or part of a homeowner's premises classifiable as "curtilage."42
35 David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the United States Supreme
Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught Some
Lessons for Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 306 (2000).
36 158 U.S. 550 (1895) (Harlan, J.). For an explication of Beard's role in the
development of justification defenses, see Kopel, supra note 35, at 305-07.
37 Beard, 158 U.S. at 559-60. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan in dicta
noted that "the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against the
enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed, to avoid
chastisement, or even to save human life; and that tendency is well illustrated by
the recent decisions of our courts." Id. at 561-62. Beard was cited recently in New
York v. Tanella, 239 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
38 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).
39 Id. at 243, 107 N.E. at 497.
40 See People v. Jones, 3 N.Y.3d 491, 495, 821 N.E.2d 955, 957, 788 N.Y.S.2d
651, 653 n.3 (2004) (" '[The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as
well as for his defence against injury and violence .. '") (quoting Semayne's Case,
(1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.)); People v. White, 127 Misc. 2d 219, 220-21, 484
N.Y.S.2d 994, 995 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1984) (reciting the English common-law
requirement that a person "retreat to the wall," except for when "attacked within his
dwelling, or its curtilage").
41 158 U.S. at 599-60. Beard involved an armed dispute over a cow. Upon
spying his assailant, defendant "went at once from his dwelling into the lot.., about
50 or 60 yards from his house, and near to that part of an adjoining field or lot where
the cow was." Id. at 552.
42 See, e.g., State v. Frizzelle, 89 S.E.2d 725, 726 (N.C. 1955) ("[The curtilage of
the home will ordinarily be construed to include at least the yard around the
dwelling house as well as the area occupied by barns, cribs, and other
outbuildings."). Derived from the common law, curtilage's initial role was to extend
to surrounding lands the same protection against burglary given to the house.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).
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Where an express statutory definition omits curtilage, its reach
is often limited. 43  Conversely, where legislative intent to
encompass curtilage is clear, its boundaries are drawn more
liberally.44  Departing from Beard, however, few' if any
jurisdictions have extended the dwelling's favored status all the
way to property lines. 45
2. The Dwelling Exception in New York Before and After Aiken
No statutory definition of "dwelling" for purposes of retreat
exists in New York. 46 Although the Court of Appeals has noted
that statutory language can be good evidence of legislative
intent,47 it has refused to import a definition of "dwelling" from
"another Penal Law statute absent legislative authority for doing
so."48 Additionally, "[b]ecause section 35.15 was part of an
omnibus package of legislation, there is no specific legislative
43 A Missouri court, for instance, has required retreat all the way up to, but not
past, the threshold of one's physical house. See State v. Gardner, 606 S.W.2d 236,
239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). For purposes of justification, Missouri equates "dwelling"
with "any building, inhabitable structure, or conveyance of any kind ... which has a
roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein
at night." Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.011(2) (2007).
44 New Hampshire's view reflects its live-free-or-die philosophy. Its self-defense
provision authorizes deadly force against anyone threatening a felony "against the
actor within such actor's dwelling or its curtilage." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4-
II(d) (2007) (emphasis added). Hence, the state's highest court has found defensive
deadly force potentially justifiable, without retreat, on "defendant's beach at some
distance from his cottage." State v. Pugliese, 422 A.2d 1319, 1322 (N.H. 1980).
45 See State v. Provoid, 266 A.2d 307, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) ("The
few cases dealing with the subject have emphatically affirmed that the curtilage of
one's residence does not.., extend to a public thoroughfare running along the
boundary of one's property."); see also Valentine v. State, 98 So. 483, 488 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1923) (refusing likewise to "extend the wholesome ancient doctrine that a
man's house is his castle" to include all surrounding lands). But see Jones v. State,
398 So. 2d 360, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (affording no-retreat instruction to
defendant in yard of house "only a few steps from the road").
46 See People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 774 N.E.2d 198, 201, 746
N.Y.S.2d 434, 437 (2002) (labeling the definition "conspicuously absent").
47 Id. at 181-82, 774 N.E.2d at 202, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
48 See People v. Powell, 54 N.Y.2d 524, 529 & n.4, 430 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 & n.4,
446 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 & n.4 (1981) (contrasting "dwelling" under Penal Law section
35.15 with "home," "residence," and "public place" in other provisions).
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history underlying the [exception's] adoption."49  The term's
parameters therefore have been set judicially.
As defined by the Court of Appeals, "dwelling" for purposes
of retreat is synonymous with "residence. °50 Whether a given
location is part of a defendant's dwelling or residence hinges on
the extent to which she "exercises exclusive possession and
control over the area in question."51  Thus, a dwelling
"encompasses a house, an apartment or a part of a structure
where defendant lives and where others are ordinarily
excluded-the antithesis of which is routine access to or use of an
area by strangers."52 For a structure to qualify, the defendant
must actually be lodging there regularly. 53
Accordingly, "whether the area where the struggle occurred
was part of the defendant's dwelling" is a factual question for
resolution on a case-by-case basis. 54 Still, the guideposts are
relatively restrictive. Places that as a matter of law may not
qualify as a dwelling to exempt one from retreat include a back
porch, 55 front yard,56 brownstone hallway,5 7 hotel corridor,
58
49 Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d at 181, 774 N.E.2d at 201, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 437
(rejecting the meaning of "dwelling" as utilized within New York's burglary
statutes). Connecticut's legislature, on the other hand, has not left its courts
guessing. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (2007) (incorporating burglary-related
definition of "dwelling" into retreat exemption).
50 Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d at 182, 774 N.E.2d at 203, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
51 Id. at 182-83, 774 N.E.2d at 203, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
52 Id. at 183, 774 N.E.2d at 203, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
53 See People v. Shaut, 261 A.D.2d 960, 961, 690 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (4th Dep't
1999) (holding dwelling exception inapplicable where the defendant had removed all
of his belongings almost two months earlier, had not visited or paid rent since, and
had leased separate premises); cf. People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257, 260, 667 N.E.2d
308, 309, 644 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (1996) (keeping an office and periodically visiting
estranged wife in former residence presented factual issue of whether residence was
the defendant's dwelling). Coincidentally, that a dwelling be a "building which is
usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night," N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00(3)
(Consol. 2007), is the statutory definition formally rejected by the Court of Appeals
in Hernandez.
54 People v. Carrera, 282 A.D.2d 614, 616, 725 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (2d Dep't
2001).
55 See People v. Childs, 21 A.D.2d 809, 810, 250 N.Y.S.2d 926, 928 (2d Dep't
1964). Our North Carolinian archer from the Introduction can rejoice.
56 People v. Gaines, 229 A.D.2d 448, 448, 645 N.Y.S.2d 510, 510 (2d Dep't 1996).
57 People v. McCurdy, 86 A.D.2d 493, 497, 450 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (2d Dep't
1982).




accessible but separate downstairs quarters, 59 and a normally
secure apartment stairwell.60
Three New York cases involving apartment doorways track
the dwelling exception's evolution. Two decades ago, in People v.
White,61 a New York trial court held that a person standing in his
girlfriend's apartment doorway "was under no duty when
attacked by the complainant to retreat into the apartment."62 In
Aiken, the Court of Appeals invalidated White by holding the
opposite for tenants. 63 Most recently, in People v. Wimberly,64 the
Appellate Division (citing Aiken) held that a woman who entered
the hallway to stab her victim "violated her duty to retreat since
she could have stayed in her apartment with complete safety."65
This progression-(1) no duty to retreat within; (2) duty to
retreat within; (3) duty to remain within-appears to paint the
cavalier, violent New York apartment dweller into an
increasingly small corner. Taking pains to square Aiken with
precedent, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the threshold of
defendant's apartment "straddled both the private apartment
and the public hall" and therefore "did not function as the asylum
of the home."66 It is illogical, however, that the litmus test for
being a dwelling-exclusive possession and control-would have
been satisfied by an apartment doorway twenty years ago but not
now.
67
The Court of Appeals likely could have avoided the dwelling
question and instead rejected defendant's appeal on "initial
59 People v. Barber, 269 A.D.2d 758, 758, 703 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (4th Dep't 2000)
("The downstairs flat was operated as a day care center by defendant's girlfriend.").
60 People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 774 N.E.2d 198, 203, 746 N.Y.S.2d
434, 439 (2002).
61 127 Misc. 2d 219, 484 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1984).
62 Id. at 222, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
63 People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 330, 828 N.E.2d 74, 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163
(2005).
64 19 A.D.3d 518, 798 N.Y.S.2d 470 (2d Dep't 2005).
65 Id. at 519, 798 N.Y.S.2d at 470. But see Commonwealth v. Daniels, 301 A.2d
841, 845 (Pa. 1973) (holding no retreat violation where defendant exited apartment,
chased assailant into stairwell, and stabbed him from behind).
66 Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d at 330, 828 N.E.2d at 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 163 ("A nonresident
could stand there and knock, ring a bell or turn the door's handle.").
67 Although the trial court in White focused on the castle doctrine, its ruling is
saved by the fact that the defendant's girlfriend and her minor son were "outside the
apartment in the common hallway." 127 Misc. 2d at 222, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 996. Had
the defendant by himself gone inside and locked the door, it clearly would not have
been "with complete personal safety, to oneself and others." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 35.15(2)(a) (Consol. 2007).
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aggressor" grounds. It is well settled in New York that "[a] man
who is himself the aggressor or who needlessly resumes the fight,
gains no immunity because he kills in his own dwelling."68 The
limitation has been codified in the Penal Law, which denies
retreat only to someone attacked "in his or her dwelling and not
the initial aggressor."69 Being an aggressor, apparently, is not
terribly difficult. In deciding whether someone is an aggressor
who has forfeited the right to justified self-defense, 70 New York
lends probative weight even to circumstantial evidence like prior
threats, "whether or not such threats are communicated" to the
other party. 71 Brandishing the eventual murder weapon after
bashing it into the victim's wall, conversely, would seem
sufficiently direct.72 In fact, the Appellate Division below denied
the Aiken defendant's appeal due to "the overwhelming evidence
that [he] unjustifiably attacked the victim outside of [his]
apartment."73 Hence, that Aiken's issue was framed as whether
"a defendant standing in the doorway between his apartment and
the common hall of a multi-unit building ha[s] a duty under
Penal Law section 35.15 to retreat into his home when he can
safely do so"74 is telling. The Court of Appeals likely viewed
Aiken as an opportunity to redefine the rules governing retreat.
Conceivably, its holding makes New York the nation's most
retreat-happy jurisdiction when it comes to dwellings. In New
Jersey, for example, a person standing in her doorway has "no
legal duty to withdraw indoors" before retaliating with deadly
force. 75 Likewise, a Missouri homeowner must retreat all the
way to the threshold of her physical house, but no further.
76
Aiken counsels to keep going.
68 People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 245, 107 N.E. 496, 498 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).
69 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (Consol. 2007) (emphasis added).
70 See People v. Petty, 7 N.Y.3d 277, 285, 852 N.E.2d 1155, 1161, 819 N.Y.S.2d
684, 689 (2006) (reaffirming that for someone who is found "the initial
aggressor... the justification defense is generally not available").
71 Id. at 285, 852 N.E.2d at 1161, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
72 As a refresher, these were the Aiken defendant's pre-homicidal activities.
73 People v. Aiken, 6 A.D.3d 236, 237, 774 N.Y.S.2d 328, 328 (1st Dep't 2004).
Other courts have sidestepped the dwelling exception by focusing on the killer's
untoward behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (loading shotgun on outdoor porch).
74 People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 325, 828 N.E.2d 74, 75, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159
(2005).
75 State v. Bonano, 284 A.2d 345, 348 (N.J. 1971).
76 See State v. Gardner, 606 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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II. BALANCING PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
SELF-DEFENSE ARENA
A. The Dwelling Exception May Be Interpreted as a Defense-of
Property Rule
1. No Need to Hide in the Basement or Abandon the Children
The practicalities of personal combat suggest that in most
situations where someone is attacked in her own dwelling, the
retreat rule simply does not apply. "The exception to the duty to
retreat is premised upon the notion that when a person is in his
or her own home or its curtilage, there is no safer place to which
to retreat."7 7  With a deadly felon lurking in the foyer, no
reasonable person would be expected to find refuge in a bedroom,
basement, or attic.78 The only truly safe alternative would be to
evacuate the home at once.
Nor is the dwelling exception grounded in the "historical
notion of the home as a place critical for the protection of the
family."79 More than one court has cautioned that "[m]andating
a duty to retreat for defense of dwelling claims will force people
to leave their homes by the back door while their family members
are exposed to danger."80  Such reasoning ignores that escape
from conflict is compelled only when it can be undertaken with
absolute safety "to oneself and others."81
These principles, revolving around necessity, appear to
render even the dwelling exception "a neutral modification that
77 State v. Warren, 794 A.2d 790, 794 (N.H. 2002).
78 For a contrary thought experiment, see State v. Pranckus, 815 A.2d 678, 687-
88 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). The defendant in Pranckus was convicted of murdering
two teenagers at a house party. The court rejected his justification defense due to
imputed knowledge that retreat was possible via an adjacent laundry room, which
"had a door that would close and block the entry of others from the kitchen into that
room." Id. at 687. Although the Pranckus defendant provoked the encounter in
someone else's dwelling, the obvious drawbacks of requiring a homeowner to cower
in a laundry room outweigh any negligible safety benefits.
79 State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Minn. 1999).
80 People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 327, 828 N.E.2d 74, 77, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161
(2005) (quoting Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at 901).
81 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (Consol. 2007) (emphasis added). Moreover, no
other inference is acceptable where a statute lacks explicit language regarding the
safety of third parties when retreating and yet authorizes deadly force in their
defense. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19 (2007). Otherwise, defending another
would subject the actor to potential criminal liability for not retreating.
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does not change the normal operation of the defensive force
principle."8 2  Without some other explanation, a separately
codified dwelling exception adds little to an already seemingly
redundant retreat rule.8 3
2. No Need to Take to the Highways
History supports the notion that the dwelling exception is
meant to prevent people from having to flee their homes in times
of danger. New York's bellwether case, People v. Tomlins,8 4 made
clear this very principle nearly a century ago. The defendant in
Tomlins was a father convicted of shooting and killing his adult
son on the ground floor of their shared premises.8 5 Although the
father claimed "that he had acted justifiably, in lawful self-
defense,"8 6 the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant
"had no right to use the weapon against his son, unless all
reasonable means of retreating were cut off."87 Taking judicial
notice of seemingly limitless escape routes, the trial court further
instructed that if defendant "could have gotten off the porch, and
gone across the lot, and down the road, or around the house, or
anywhere, to a place of safety, then the law says that he should
have done so."8 8
The Court of Appeals in Tomlins disagreed with the trial
court and held instead that the defendant had no "duty to
abandon his home and take refuge in the streets."8 9 Invoking the
castle doctrine, Judge Cardozo wrote that it "never has been the
law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to
retreat."90  Construing the dwelling exception from the inside
82 2 ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 80.
83 See discussion supra Part I.A. 1.
84 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).
85 Id. at 241, 107 N.E. at 497 ("The shooting took place... in the little cottage in
Stony Point where the son had been born and reared.").
86 Id. at 241, 107 N.E. at 497. The father testified alternatively that "he had
acted without premeditation, when blinded by passion because of blows and insults."
Id. at 241, 107 N.E. at 497. Family mediation might have been appropriate.
87 Id. at 242, 107 N.E. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88 Id. at 242, 107 N.E. at 497 (internal quotations marks omitted).
89 Id. at 244, 107 N.E. at 498.
90 Id. at 243, 107 N.E. at 497. The exception's applicability to "occupants of the
same household" was reaffirmed in the domestic violence context in People v. Jones,
3 N.Y.3d 491, 496, 821 N.E.2d 955, 958, 788 N.Y.S.2d 651, 654 (2004) (stating that a
battered spouse need not retreat). But see State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 476 (R.I.
1986) ("[Sleveral jurisdictions that have adopted the castle doctrine have held that it
has no application to cases between two persons entitled to occupy the same
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looking out, Cardozo declared that a beleaguered resident "may
stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under no duty to
take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own
home."91  When the exception was later made statutory, its
drafters pointed to Tomlins "as representative of the application
of the traditional rule which [the statute] was intended to
codify."92 This traditional rule is born from the idea-recently
echoed by the Court of Appeals in Aiken-that "people's homes
are their castles, and that as such one's home is a place of
sanctuary; a castle to which, and not from which, a person
retreats."93  Hence, both precedent and common sense dictate
that "requiring a person standing in the doorway to step inside
the apartment to avoid a violent encounter is not the equivalent
of mandating retreat from one's home."94
3. No Need to Surrender the Castle
Thus, it makes sense to think of the dwelling exception as a
stand-alone provision in defense of the physical home. Drawing
upon English scholarly authority, the Court of Appeals implied
this in Tomlins. The besieged homeowner can stay put, wrote
Cardozo, "'for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him
from flying, for that would be to give up the possession of his
house to his adversary by his flight.' 95
Indeed, "the asylum of the home" is hardly metaphysical. 96
A house brings sanctuary because it provides concrete
shelter from unpleasant externalities, whether thieves or
thunderstorms. Even minus a statutory dwelling exception,
there is certainly no legal duty to abandon one's family to the
dwelling.").
91 Tomlins, 213 N.Y. at 243, 107 N.E. at 497.
92 People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175, 182, 774 N.E.2d 198, 202, 746 N.Y.S.2d
434, 438 (2002). Showing its durability, Cardozo's "fugitive" language from Tomlins
was quoted eighty-nine years later in People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 327, 828 N.E.2d
74, 77, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (2005).
93 Jones, 3 N.Y.3d at 495, 821 N.E.2d at 957, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (emphasis
added).
94 Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d at 330, 828 N.E.2d at 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 163. Indeed,
Tomlins is cited with approval by Missouri, whose dwelling exception reads: "A
person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or vehicle where
the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining." MO. REV. STAT.
§ 563.031(3) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
95 Tomlins, 213 N.Y. at 243, 107 N.E. at 497 (quoting 1 HALE'S PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 486 (1736)).
96 Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d at 330, 828 N.E.2d at 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
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mercy of prowlers, and very likely no duty to hide in a closet for
the duration of the prowl.97 The dwelling exception to the retreat
rule proclaims that citizens should not hesitate before answering
calls to arms in their own castles. The alternative would be
surrendering one's real property and finding "refuge in the
streets, 'g where sanctuary from thieves and thunderstorms is
nonexistent. Respecting private property in this way leads to
greater security overall-that someone might be safer in the long
run while outdoors and away from her home is absurd. Streets
provide little refuge. Inviolate safety is built by actual walls.
A pair of overarching themes is clear. One, citizens have a
"right to expect absolute safety within their own homes."99 Two,
they have a concomitant right to freedom from damage to their
proprietary interests in real property. 100 The dwelling exception
to the retreat rule thus protects both home and homeowner. If
the opposite were true, taking to the highways would not be only
customary; it would be required. "A duty to retreat is
incompatible with the right to prevent the commission of a felony
within one's home,"'1 1 most notably theft of the home itself.
10 2
B. Pulling up the Drawbridge: Applauding and Extending
Aiken's Approach
1. Curtilage's Role in the Justification Equation Should Be
Limited
Given the life-and-death stakes involved, Aiken is correct to
construe the dwelling exception narrowly. The exemption clearly
confers a special immunity upon the home, though "somewhat at
odds with this privileged status accorded the home is the state's
general interest in protecting life.'' °3  Therefore, immunity
97 See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
98 Tomlins, 213 N.Y. at 244, 107 N.E. at 498.
99 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704.5(1) (West 2007).
100 The author does not pass on the theoretical justification behind shooting an
intruder for threatening ownership of one's plasma television set.
101 State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Minn. 1999).
102 Rather than leaving this a necessary inference, the Model Penal Code's
drafters made it express. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(i) (1980) (declaring
deadly force justifiable if the actor believes that "the person against whom the force
is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim
of right to its possession").




should extend no farther than necessary to promote the goals of
safety to person and property. The starting point is that
"[p]remises and house are not synonymous words." 10 4
Cases defining curtilage in the Fourth Amendment context
offer guidance. Protection from warrantless government
searches generally extends to any location in which a homeowner
has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."'1 5 This meshes with
the inquiry of whether a defendant claiming justification had
"exclusive possession and control"10 6 of the area in question.
Naturally, one has the greatest expectation of privacy in those
parts of her premises that are least accessible to outsiders. Thus,
the soundest rationale for including curtilage within the dwelling
exception is that the area "relate[s] to the intimate activities of
the home."' 0 7  Equating dwelling with residence absorbs this
idea, since residents often engage in the same activities, "such as
eating, reading, sleeping, entertaining, and relaxing," in their
backyards and living rooms.108
Aiken's holding seems correct on its peculiar facts-an
apartment's doorway bears no hallmarks of exclusivity or
intimacy-but does not go far enough. The dwelling exemption
across all retreat jurisdictions should extend only to inhabited
physical structures and completely enclosed appurtenances, such
as porches and terraces. 10 9  This workable rule allows fact
finders to focus less on whether something is or is not a dwelling
on a case-by-case basis, and more on the "central question
[of] whether defendant reasonably believed she was about to
suffer death or serious physical injury." 0 Furthermore, while
curtilage inquiries are appropriate for civil rights claims, "[i]t
104 Valentine v. State, 98 So. 483, 487 (Ala. Ct. App. 1923) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
105 E.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1276 (2d Cir. 1996); see also
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (proposing multi-factor inquiry for
resolving curtilage questions).
106 People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 774 N.E.2d 198, 203, 746 N.Y.S.2d
434, 439 (2002).
107 People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 558, 523 N.E.2d 291, 294, 528 N.Y.S.2d
15, 18 (1988).
108 Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d at 330 n.4, 828 N.E.2d at 78 n.4, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 162 n.4.
109 The Court of Appeals seemingly adopted this as New York's approach in
Hernandez. The New Jersey Supreme Court has likewise stated that this might be
"the better rule." State v. Bonano, 284 A.2d 345, 348 (N.J. 1971).
110 People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 661, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 563 (4th Dep't
1984).
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may be seriously doubted whether a concept arising in the
[medieval] land law furnishes an intelligent guide in determining
whether the taking of a life is to be justified." '11
A recently introduced New York State Senate bill illustrates
the problems with coextending property and justification law.
The proposal would amend the dwelling exception under Penal
Law section 35.15(a)(i) to include "surrounding grounds," defined
as "real property owned by the owner of the dwelling or in any
common areas owned by, a cooperative or condominium
association."'1 12 This would make property owners a privileged
class for self-defense purposes. 113 For instance, someone on his
property acres from his house would be exempt from retreating
before using defensive deadly force. By comparison, a neighbor
traversing an easement over that same area, mere yards from
her own home, would not be. Nor would be an innocent
trespasser who happened upon the property without knowing
who owned it. The flaws in such artificial distinctions are
apparent, especially with retreat so intertwined with (and often a
proxy for negating) necessity. A deed, without more, should not
change one's status in the eyes of the criminal law. 114
A front yard or lawn, however pleasantly landscaped, is not a
residence. It provides no "reasonable expectation of seclusion
and refuge from the outside world."1 15  Similarly, an outdoor
weekend barbecue has never been the functional equivalent of an
indoor Sunday dinner. The latter is prized in large part for
occurring in a place of sanctuary "from which nonresidents could
ordinarily be excluded."'1 6  Conversely, the former involves a
11 Bonano, 284 A.2d at 348.
112 N.Y.S. 685-A, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (2007), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S00685&sh=t. A competing New York State Assembly bill would
eliminate retreat for anyone "in a place where he or she has a right to be." N.Y.A.
8182, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (2007), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=
A08182&sh=t. Both single-house proposals were referred to their respective Codes
Committees, though neither is approaching a final vote.
113 Ownership is key; regular apartment hallways like Aiken's are noticeably
omitted.
114 This view is not entirely novel. See State v. Lawrence, 569 S.W.2d 263, 266
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing the right to use deadly force in defense of habitation
but refusing to extend it to "mere breaking of the curtilage").
115 People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 330, 828 N.E.2d 74, 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163
(2005). A yard clearly would be part of someone's residence where it is fenced in a
manner that bars seeing into it, offers no means of outside entry except by climbing
the fence, and is marked as private property.
116 Id. at 330, 828 N.E.2d at 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
[Vol. 82:359
PEOPLE v. AIKEN
voluntary confrontation with the community. Should storm
clouds or an unpleasant situation brew, the resident-if he can
safely do so-need simply pull "up the drawbridge, to be secure in
his castle. ' 117 An exemption from retreat for a homeowner who
barely discerns danger to his person or property, and yet chooses
to escalate hostilities, may be a free pass for murder.
2. Standing One's Ground Presents Practical Difficulties
Leading the charge, in 2006 between ten and fifteen states
repealed their laws requiring a person to consider retreat before
using defensive deadly force.118 Supporters claim that these
"stand your ground" laws empower victims to fight back, while
detractors argue that the "shoot first" measures will increase
violence in the aggregate while allowing the already criminally
inclined to evade conviction.11 9 Still others "doubt the laws will
make a practical difference." 120 The latter view appears contrary
to reality. Many of the incidents making headlines involve
neighbors or acquaintances freely assaulting each other with
deadly weapons, rather than people successfully repelling home
invasions by strangers. The early case studies include a crack
addict beating his drug dealer to death with a lamp and a
homeowner shooting his neighbor while arguing over garbage
bins.1 21 These are no surprise, since the Florida statute, by
creating a presumption of "reasonable fear of imminent peril,"
effectively authorizes deadly force to repel attempted trespass.
122
117 Id. at 330, 828 N.E.2d at 79, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
118 Compare Liptak, supra note 3 (describing fifteen states), with Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence: After Passage of 'Shoot First' Law, Getting Away
with Murder, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 3, 2006, available at 8/3/06 USNWSW 19:20:11
(Westlaw) (describing laws in ten states). The National Rifle Association successfully
lobbied for these laws and has yet more states in its crosshairs. See, e.g., Liptak,
supra note 3. A full analysis of the measures' impact is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
119 See Tanner, supra note 19.
120 Liptak, supra note 3.
121 See One Year After Florida Law Took Effect, Six Dead, Two Others Wounded,
and Killers Hoping to Walk Away Scot Free, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 30, 2006,
available at 9/30/06 USNWSW 12:20:51 (Westlaw). It is submitted that the majority
of disputes about garbage are senseless.
122 FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2007) (stating that a killing is presumptively
justified if the victim "was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or
had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle"); see
also TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32(b)(1)(A) (Vernon 2007) (extending the presumption to
"place[s] of business or employment").
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A new Missouri statute replaces the presumption with a
conjunction-deadly force is justified if reasonably believed
necessary or as against a trespasser-although it continues to
require retreat generally. 123
The recent legislative trend only reaffirms using retreat to
deter senseless violence. Due to the safety and necessity
requirements built into retreat and self-defense, retreating is not
commanded in the vast majority of cases. Nonetheless, the duty
to retreat is an important mechanism allowing juries and judges
to decide, in sterile courtrooms after the fact, whether a given
defendant truly and reasonably believed that defensive deadly
force was warranted, or whether that defendant was himself an
aggressor. In People v. Russell,124 for instance, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld three murder convictions based on
"evidence that defendants did not avail themselves of
opportunities for safe retreat." For their part, the defendants
had waged a protracted gang-related gun battle across several
city blocks before killing a bystander.125
Even in less extreme cases, evidence of safe alternatives is
"relevant to the reasonableness of defendant's perceptions [even
if] not to the question of whether defendant was obligated to
retreat."1 26 This logic has continued vitality. The defendant in
People v. Grady127 was convicted after shooting two police
officers. He claimed to reasonably believe they were about to kill
him. The Appellate Division disagreed: "[S]ince the officers were
down, one disarmed, there is no reasonable view of the evidence
that defendant-who remained standing and uninjured-had no
available avenue of safe retreat or even attempted to retreat."1 28
In homicide cases, "[tihe People are required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified."129
Where defensive deadly force is allowed as a first resort,
however, courts and juries will be left to speculate regarding the
accused's thoughts. Was the person actually in fear? Was the
123 Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.031(2) (2007).
124 91 N.Y.2d 280, 290, 693 N.E.2d 193, 196, 670 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (1998).
125 Id. at 280, 693 N.E.2d at 196, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
126 People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 658, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 561 (4th Dep't
1984).
127 40 A.D.3d 1368, 838 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d Dep't 2007).
128 Id. at 1372, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 212.




killing defensive? Was it calculated? Most importantly, was it
necessary? Evidence concerning retreat may be disallowed or, if
allowed, disregarded. 130 The defendant standing his ground thus
gains a tactical advantage in the courtroom, and the prosecution
loses a key weapon in its arsenal. These byproducts may not be
accidental. Texas, which recently eliminated its largely nominal
retreat provision, made one consequence explicit: "[I]n
determining whether an actor.., reasonably believed that the
use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not
consider whether the actor failed to retreat."
131
3. Standing One's Ground Is Not Ethically Mandated
Requiring retreat brings the added benefit of affirming the
value of human life. Many have recognized "the sanctity of
human life as the primary principle underlying the duty to
retreat."'132 The counter-argument is that "retreat is said to
injure the actor's reputation and self-respect by requiring
cowardly conduct."'133 Acknowledging this tension in his classic
Tomlins opinion, Cardozo upheld retreat "even though it may not
seem dignified and manly."' 34 Not surprisingly, states that allow
an individual to stand her ground sometimes label their
justification provisions "true man" laws. 35
Three responses should quell critics. One, there is nothing
undignified about avoiding deadly conflicts. In fact, weighing the
options and choosing not to enter an affray with someone bent on
causing harm is often braver than lashing out violently in fear.
Needless bravado, moreover, may readily bring death to either
party. 3 6 Two, irrespective of location, "one is never obliged to
130 Perhaps in part because of this, prosecutors under Florida's new anti-retreat
laws have often refrained from bringing charges. See Liptak, supra note 3 ("The law
also forbids the arrest, detention or prosecution of the people covered by the law, and
it prohibits civil suits against them.").
131 TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32(d) (Vernon 2007).
132 People v. Canales, 624 N.W.2d 918, 919 (Mich. 2001) (Corrigan, C.J.,
dissenting).
133 2 ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 81.
134 People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 242, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).
135 See, e.g., State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tenn. 1995) ("Under the 'true
man' doctrine, one need not retreat from the threatened attack of another even
though one may safely do so."). The label stems from language in Beard that "a true
man who is without fault is not obligated [sic] to fly from an assailant." Id. (quoting
Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 561 (1895)).
136 See Michael Wilson, Actress Killed in Lower East Side Robbery, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2005, at Bi (taunting of mugger by victim leads to fatal shooting).
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retreat from a sudden, fierce, and violent attack, because under
such circumstances a reasonable person would, as a rule, find it
necessary to use force against force without retreating."'13 7 New
York has long recognized this pragmatic constraint. 138 Three,
correct application of the retreat doctrine will not "require an
innocent victim to increase his own peril out of regard for the
safety of a murderous assailant."'139 An individual near her home
will never be ordered to rummage for keys or fiddle with locks to
preserve the life of a rapidly approaching burglar or rapist.
Someone's arguing with an acquaintance in an open doorway or
on a front porch is another matter entirely, and the culpability
far less one-sided. The law should not shield those who violate
"the duty to refrain from staging a counteroffensive rather than
the duty to retreat."'140
CONCLUSION
"The duty to retreat reflects the idea that a killing is justified
only as a last resort, an act impermissible as long as other
reasonable avenues are open."141 In Aiken, the New York Court
of Appeals boldly proclaimed its support for the value of human
life. At first glance, the decision appears to favor would-be
criminals. Upon closer inspection, however, Aiken reveals a
reasoned effort to condemn and hopefully avert senseless
killings. This is especially true in light of the retreat rule's
narrow application. Granted, some citizens will respond to
situations violently regardless of the status of justification law in
their home states. It is precisely these individuals whom the
criminal law should target.
Life's daily incidents breed unavoidable yet temporary
conflict. Death, on the other hand, is permanent. With the
nationwide trend in favor of shooting first and asking questions
137 People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 40 (Mich. 2002); accord Brown v. United
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) ("[I]t is not a condition of immunity that one in that
situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it
possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.").
138 See People v. Asan, 22 N.Y.2d 526, 531, 239 N.E.2d 913, 915, 293 N.Y.S.2d
326, 329 (1968) (disapproving the incorrect "impression that a person feloniously
attacked" with a deadly weapon needs to retreat before defending herself).
139 Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Mass. 1975).
140 People v. Lugo, 291 A.D.2d 359, 360, 739 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (1st Dep't 2002).
141 People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 328, 828 N.E.2d 74, 77, 795 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 82:359
2008] PEOPLE v. AIKEN 381
later, a decision like Aiken's is welcome. Whether defensive force
is justified rightly turns on necessity, and the notion that
unnecessary killings should be tolerated or encouraged is barely
defensible. In cases where pulling up the drawbridge is just as
easy as pulling the trigger, the ground that one stands is neither
the legal nor the ethical high ground. Neighbors all over New
York should thank their highest court for refusing to equate
retreat with surrender.
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